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Introduction 
 
In recent years, BRIC countries have demonstrated high rates of economic growth, rapid 
increases in GDP per capita and growing capital accumulation, and have been playing an 
increasingly important role in the global economy. However, as middle-income countries (low-
income in the case of India), BRICs still rely on development finance. Multilateral development 
banks (MDBs) have become an important source of external long-term capital available to 
BRICs.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the role of multilateral development banks in 
BRICs and to take a look at the banks’ operations as well as problems related to MDBs’ 
performance in BRIC countries.  
A brief note about the organization of this paper. The First Section contains an overview 
of the specific features of multilateral development banks as an instrument of development 
finance. Section Two looks at the current membership of BRICs in multilateral development 
banks. The Third Section reviews MDBs’ approach towards access of BRICs to their 
concessional lending and ordinary capital resources and discovers the graduation policy of 
development banks. Section Four section provides an analysis of current trends of development 
finance by MDBs. The Fifth Section discusses a wide range of questions dealing with analysis 
of MDB loans distribution by sector, development effects of operations and problems of loan 
commitments in BRICs. The Sixth and final section considers policy implications for China.  
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1. Multilateral development banks as an instrument of 
development finance 
 
The realm of multilateral development banks (MDBs) comprises international 
development banks (the World Bank Group), regional development banks (the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and sub-regional development banks that 
aim to promote economic integration in specific geographic zones (the European Investment 
Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, the Eurasian 
Development Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and others).  
Multilateral development banks play an important complementary role in development 
finance. Using different capital-raising instruments (loans, bonds, deposits, donor contributions), 
they accumulate resources to finance development of borrowing member states. Multilaterals 
provide long-term loans, grants, guarantees, equity investments, technical assistance to promote 
economic and social development. MDBs also aim to finance regional public goods (building 
regional infrastructure, increasing regional industry competitiveness, supporting environmental 
projects, etc.). 
Due to MDBs’ status and organization structure, multilateral development institutions 
grant them significant advantages over commercial banks and other private investors.  
 International, regional and some sub-regional banks allow developed countries to join 
(including countries outside the relevant region) to ensure high credit ratings and access to 
capital on favorable terms on international financial markets.  
 MDBs as non profit organizations are able to finance large-scale projects which are 
difficult to handle and which also may not be attractive for commercial banks because of their 
low ROI.  
 Multilaterals mostly lend directly to governments and provide finance to cover 
government spending. Multilateral development institutions primarily require sovereign 
guarantees to reduce credit risk.  
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 MDBs as international institutions are not subject to national law requirements of 
member countries, i.e. banking regulation, tax codes, etc. Therefore, they are not required to pay 
most of the taxes normally levied on for-profit organizations. 
 Membership in MDBs does not come at a high cost to shareholders. The reason is that 
the subscribed capital of MDB does not have to be fully paid by the member states. 
Shareholders guarantee that the remaining unpaid-up capital (callable capital) will be made 
available on the request of the bank.  
 MDBs also provide a forum for coordination of policy towards borrowers and collect 
information and research that can be useful for investors undertaking new investments in a 
borrowing member country (Ratha, 2001).  
However, multilaterals do not aim to take over a niche served by private investors, and 
they follow the additionality principle, complementing, rather than substituting for, government 
investments or capital raised on favorable terms from third parties. Furthermore, the cost-
sharing mode of project financing by multilateral banks allows for a more effective mobilization 
of public and private capital in both developed and developing countries.  
Financial mechanisms of MDBs are beneficial for borrowing member countries. MDBs 
respond to rising demand for capital in those developing countries that have limited access to 
international financial markets. Some MDBs organize soft-loan funds which allow the poorest 
countries to borrow at low interest rates.  
MDBs’ policy towards developing countries has changed in order to meet their demand 
for financial resources. Initially, MDBs started with quite different policy objectives, but over 
time these differences among them have narrowed (Culpeper, 1994). International and regional 
development banks significantly widened operations financing social development, 
infrastructure and policy-based projects, institution and industry modernization, structural 
adjustment, poverty reduction, etc. Oil, debt and financial crises of the last decades made it 
necessary to elaborate special emergency facilities for borrowing member countries to offset the 
outflow of private capital during financial instability and provide structural adjustment 
programs.  
Multilaterals act mostly worldwide and increase distribution of financial resources both to 
developed and developing countries. In the last decades not only did they expand their loan 
portfolio, but also became a significant lending window for borrowing member countries. The 
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EBRD became the largest institutional investor in the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
the World Bank and AsDB along with the Japanese Government were the main donors in Asia-
Pacific.  Cumulative lending of eleven MDBs reached nearly USD 1.3 trillion as of year-end 
2006 (Abalkina, 2007). In the last decades, multilateral development institutions have been 
quite active as distributors of financial resources to developing countries and also to the poorer 
countries via concessional funds. By the early 1990s, nearly 50% of total official development 
finance was provided by multilateral lending facilities (A Foresight and Policy Study of the 
Multilateral Development Banks, 2000).  
2. BRICs membership in MDBs 
 
BRIC countries have different level of participation in multilateral development banks. 
First, all BRIC countries have a borrowing member status with at least two MDBs: the World 
Bank Group and their respective regional bank. Their MDB membership is linked to their 
shortage of financial resources for development. Second, People’s Republic of China and the 
Soviet Union refrained from utilization of international and regional MDB financial support 
during the Communist era. Their transition to the market economy led to their membership in 
various international organizations including multilateral banks. Third, their engagement in 
regional integration processes financed by sub-regional development banks also explains their 
membership status in corresponding MDBs. 
BRIC countries’ development of the last decade has demonstrated strong economic 
growth, increasing capital inflows, accumulation of monetary reserves. Favorable economic 
trends allowed BRICs to be more prominent on international financial markets. Gradually they 
are increasing public and private outward investments and become an important source of aid to 
other developing countries. Concessional loans granted by China, Brazil and India reached USD 
3.5 billion in 2006 (Global Development Finance, 2008). Improvements in creditworthiness of 
BRIC countries increased their ability to support MDBs (Fitch Ratings, 2007). During the last 
decades, most of BRICs achieved non-regional donor status in MDBs of Latin America and 
Africa. They use the intermediation of international funds and banks for foreign public 
investments to promote their interests on the global scene. 
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Brazil 
Brazil joined the IBRD in 1946. In the first decades, its lending progressed slowly due to 
problems with macroeconomic domestic policy in Brazil  (Culperer, 1997). During the 1950s 
and 1960s, the IBRD stopped its lending to Brazil on three different occasions for a combined 
period of nine years (in 1955-57, 1960-1964, 1969). Since the beginning of the 1970s, the 
country’s co-operation with the IBRD restarted on a regular basis. 
Brazil was one of the founders of the Inter-American development bank. The project of its 
foundation appeared at the end of the 19
th
 century and was broadly discussed during the First 
International American Conference that was held in 1890. Latin American countries intended to 
promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere and to tackle the problem of a lack of capital 
for development finance. The USA consistently rejected the proposal until 1959 – the year 
when the organization was officially inaugurated. During the interwar period, some Latin 
American countries carried out the idea of development banking by establishing national 
development institutions (corporaciones de fomento) that played the role of financial 
intermediates between international and local markets. In the meantime, Brazil founded a state 
bank for development purposes. 
Regional integration processes in Latin America were accompanied by the foundation of 
several multilateral banks that financed the production of regional public goods (the Caribbean 
Development Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the Andean 
Development Corporation). Brazil nowadays is a borrowing member of the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF) and also is one of the biggest recipients despite of the fact that 
Brazil does not belong to the Andean Community. CAF was created to promote sustained 
development and regional integration in member countries. After reorganization of the 
Corporation that led to an increase in the subscribed capital and elaboration of new methods of 
investment policy, it became the most powerful sub-regional institution in Latin America. In 
September 2009, Brazil together with other Latin American countries signed an agreement to 
found the South Bank with USD 20 billion in authorized capital. This bank is intended to be an 
alternative lending window for Latin American countries to the IMF and the World Bank. The 
new development bank has not started its operations yet. 
Brazil, like the other ВRIC countries, is also developing cooperation with MDBs without 
membership in these organizations. Investment policy of some sub-regional MDBs allows 
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lending in non-member countries or countries outside their region. For example, the Nordic 
Investment Bank (NIB) supports projects not only in the countries of the Baltic region, but also 
those projects that involve Nordic suppliers. The NIB supports projects in the 
telecommunication sphere and infrastructure in large emerging markets, especially in BRICs.  
 
Russia 
The Soviet Union participated in Bretton Woods agreements, but abstained from 
membership in the IMF and the IBRD. The Soviet Union also took part in negotiations to 
establish the AsDB, but did not support the accepted voting principles and stayed away from 
further cooperation with the bank. The Soviet Union participated only in two multilateral 
development organizations. The Soviet Union founded two sub-regional financial institutions to 
promote cooperation among the socialist-bloc countries – the International Investment Bank 
(IIB) and the International Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC). The IBEC was designed to 
provide export loans to the member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon), while the IIB concentrated on providing medium- to long-term loans to finance 
capital construction. After the Comecon was abolished in 1991, the two banks reoriented their 
activity to promote cooperation in Eastern Europe, providing loans on market terms. As a 
successor of the Soviet Union, Russia is still a majority shareholder of the banks and owns more 
than 50% of the banks’ subscribed capital. 
After the breakdown of the socialist system and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia 
started its transition to a market economy, and initiated integration into international markets. 
The transformation crisis of the 1990s forced Russia to search for external sources of finance to 
reduce its budget deficit, increase international reserves and stabilize the economy. International 
financial organizations (the IBRD, the IMF, the EBRD) which Russia joined in the early 1990s 
became a significant channel for raising capital.  
Nowadays Russia has borrowing member status in several sub-regional development 
banks founded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Reintegration of the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU) countries led to foundation of the Interstate Bank of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States in 1993, which was established to promote economic interaction in the post-Soviet area 
(the FSU) and to make payments using national currencies of the member states after 
liquidation of the Ruble zone. Today Russia owns 50% of the bank’s authorized capital. Due to 
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weak performance of the Interstate Bank, Russia together with Kazakhstan inaugurated the 
Eurasian Development Bank in 2006. The bank’s mission is to promote economic growth and 
collaboration in member states (Armenia and Tajikistan have recently joined the bank). Russia 
was a founding shareholder (17.1% of the initial capital) in The Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank (BSTDB) which started operations in 1999. The BSTDB aims to support 
economic development and cooperation in the Black Sea region, providing trade and project 
finance.  
Russia has also become a borrower from the European Investment Bank and the Nordic 
Investment Bank without attaining membership in these organizations. The lending policy of 
the EIB allows it to disburse 5% of its loans to non-member countries, and the bank is currently 
involved in several projects in north-western Russia (including construction of a waste water 
treatment plant and a flood protection barrier in St. Petersburg). The NIB finances 
environmental programs in Russia’s Baltic region and also supports projects that presume 
involvement of Nordic suppliers (especially in the telecommunications sector).   
Unlike the other BRIC countries, Russia does not have a donor member status in many 
MDBs of other regions. Russia makes contributions only to the International Development 
Association. However, currently Russia is in accession talks with the IADB and the AsDB. 
Membership in these regional development banks will allow Russian companies to participate 
in projects in Latin America and Asia. 
 
India 
India was one of the founding members of the IBRD and has benefited from the bank’s 
development assistance. In the first decades, the impact of IBRD loans on India’s development 
was quite limited due its weak creditworthiness (Mason, Asher, 1973). After the IDA was 
established in 1960, India mostly switched to concessional borrowing and nowadays is its 
largest borrower according to accumulated disbursed loan commitments.  
In 1958, the World Bank established the Aid-to-India Consortium consisting of the World 
Bank group and thirteen developed countries. Its activity focused on selecting priorities for 
foreign aid for India and helping the country to get access to financial facilities for development. 
The World Bank together with other members of the consortium coordinated the distribution of 
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aid by sectors. Developed countries provided assistance to India on a bilateral basis but in 
accordance with priorities worked out by the consortium.  
The history of India’s cooperation with the AsDB dates back to 1966 when the 
organization was officially inaugurated. After establishment of the Asian Development Fund in 
1974, India got access to concessional lending which was limited in the late 1990s by the 
mandate of the main donors, although economic indices of India attest to the country’s 
compliance with the terms and conditions of soft-loan funds. 
For promotion of regional integration in South Asia, SAARC members founded the South 
Asian Development Fund in 1996. It provides assistance to projects of regional significance in 
the following areas: industrial and social development, poverty reduction, environmental 
protection and infrastructure. In fact, the Fund acts more as a coordinator of development 
programs than an accumulator of financial resources. The fund collects public contributions of 
SAARC member states and does not raise capital on international financial markets as other 
multilateral banks do.  
In 2008, SAARC countries launched a new SAARC development fund with an initial 
capital of USD 300 million. Given its larger capital, it was not intended to raise additional 
capital from third parties. The Fund would just welcome funding from the multilateral donor 
agencies like the AsDB and the World Bank. 
India, along with the other BRIC countries, has been expanding its donor membership in 
development organizations. India has joined two development institutions in Africa getting non-
regional member status (the AfDB and the West African Development Bank). Its cooperation 
with these institutions is currently connected with the operations of the Export-Import Bank of 
India which sponsored the first India-Africa Partnership Project Conclave within the AfDB 
framework and made contributions to the WADB.  
 
China 
In the years before its transformation into a market economy started in 1978, China did 
not draw any benefits from multilateral development banks. China took part in the Bretton 
Woods Conference formally, joining both the IMF and the IBRD, but did not act as a borrower 
until China’s representation on the Boards of the two agencies was shifted from Taipei to 
Beijing in 1980 (Bottelier, 2007). Bottelier (Bottelier, 2007) cites the following explanation by 
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Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping of why China needed to restart cooperation with the World 
Bank: “We are very poor. We have lost touch with the world. We need the World Bank to catch 
up. We can do it without you, but we can do it quicker and better with you.” 
In 1985, People’s Republic of China signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
AsDB replacing Taiwan as a member of this organization. Collaboration of PRC with the 
World Bank and the AsDB was temporarily blocked after the June 4, 1989 incident in 
Tiananmen Square. Developed countries, which own a significant share of subscribed capital in 
these institutions, took sanctions against People’s Republic of China and agreed to stop lending. 
The only exception was made for projects aimed at promoting basic human needs. After the G7 
summit in Houston in 1990, PRC was allowed to apply for MDBs lending to support 
environmental protection and economic policy reform (Sanford, 1997). 
Strong economic growth and the increase in creditworthiness of People’s Republic of 
China during the past decades has influenced its collaboration with MDBs in two ways. First, 
under pressure from developed countries, China’s access to concessional lending of MDBs was 
restricted (see Section 3). Second, capital accumulation allowed China to play a more important 
role in global development finance. For this purpose, China joined several regional and sub-
regional development banks in Africa and Latin America in recent years. Nowadays China is 
the main contributor to development finance among BRIC countries.   
China acts as a donor in three African development institutions. Its participation in the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) dates back to 1985.  China intends to promote economic 
development and poverty reduction in African states by organizing the China-Africa 
Development Fund and participating in the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. China has 
become the only non-regional member in the Eastern and Southern African Trade and 
Development Bank, and is represented in the West African Development Bank by a government 
credit institution (People's Bank of China).  
Latin American countries are also a focus of the Chinese strategy to provide development 
aid. China became a member of the Caribbean Development Bank and joined the Inter-
American Development Bank in 2009 with the aim of funding several projects designed to 
address crisis-specific needs.  
Moreover, China has founded several trust funds at organizations where it has a borrowing 
member’s status. For example, in 2005 China contributed USD 30 million to the Asian 
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Development Fund (ADF) and established a USD 20 million Regional Cooperation and Poverty 
Reduction Fund with the AsDB to boost economic cooperation among developing Asian 
countries as a component of poverty reduction agenda. China became the first developing 
member country to set up such a fund with an international development agency (AsDB, 2009). 
Table 1 
Current membership status of BRIC countries in MDBs (as of October 2009) 
 
 Brazil Russia India China 
International 
International bank for reconstruction 
and development  
B B B B (since 
2000) 
International development 
association 
D D B B (till 
1999)/D 
International finance corporation B B B B 
Regional 
Inter-American development bank B - - D 
Asian development bank - - B  B  
African development bank D - D  D  
European bank for reconstruction 
and development 
- B - - 
Sub-regional 
Nordic investment bank*  B B B B 
European investment bank* - B - - 
Eurasian development bank - B - - 
International Investment Bank  - B - - 
International Bank for Economic Co-
operation 
- B - - 
Black Sea Trade and Development 
Bank  
- B - - 
Interstate bank of the CIS - B - - 
South bank B - - - 
Andean development corporation B    
Caribbean development bank - - - D 
West African development bank - - D D  
Eastern and Southern African Trade 
and Development bank  
- - - D 
* - status of a borrower without membership 
B – borrower 
D – donor  
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3. BRICs’ Eligibility for access to lending windows 
 
Multilateral development banks work out a graduation policy to determine the eligibility 
of aid recipients and their access to ordinary capital or concessional funds. Concessional loans 
are granted to poorer countries on a long term basis with a grace period and at low interest rates.  
Lending to poorer countries focuses mainly on promoting their socio-economic development 
and creating incentives for mobilization of private capital. Ordinary debt capital resources are 
distributed among comparatively more-developed countries on market terms. The guiding 
principles that define the lending window take into account the state of economic development, 
creditworthiness of the borrower nation, the country’s access to international capital markets or 
its capacity to raise domestic capital on manageable terms (ADB, 1998). 
For example, IDA eligibility criteria include relative poverty of a borrower (GNI per 
capita of less than USD 1,135 for the 2010 fiscal year) and weak creditworthiness. The AsDB 
classified borrowing countries into four groups according to debt repayment capacity and GNI 
per capita level. For both AsDB and AsDF, this graduation determines whether a borrower 
would have access to ordinary capital or soft funds only, or partial access to soft funds 
supplemented by access to ordinary capital. The operational cutoff for concessional lending is 
fixed at the same level as for IDA. The IADB also has a four-grade classification system that 
defines which one of the available lending channels should be used (ordinary capital, fund for 
special operations, intermediate financing facility). Unlike the other regional development 
banks, the EBRD provides financial resources only on market terms.  
Among the BRIC countries, Russia is the only one to have always had its access limited to 
MDBs’ hard window. At different times, all the other three BRICs used the benefit of both 
ordinary debt capital and concessional lending from international and regional MDBs. China 
stands out because it was originally eligible only to use the IDA window, and also got access to 
the IBRD window due to its development progress. Under pressure from donor countries, China 
was moved to IBRD lending-only status in 2000. The main reason for this lies in China’s strong 
economic growth and its improving access to international capital markets. Despite the fact that 
its GNI per capita corresponded to IDA cutoff level, China could raise capital only on market 
terms. India currently has the status of a blend country for the purposes of the World Bank 
Group, a status that allows the country to have access both to hard and soft lending windows. 
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Table 2 
Operational Policy of the World Bank 
 
 Country 
GNI per 
Capita, 
USD 
(2008) 
Income 
Categories 
Lending 
 
IBRD Repayment 
Terms 
IDA Repayment Terms 
 
Average 
repayment 
maturity 
(years) 
Years to 
Maturity 
 
Grace 
Period 
(years) 
Years to 
maturity 
Grant 
 
Brazil 7,450 IBRD 18  30  - - - 
Russia 9,680 IBRD 18  30  - - - 
India 1,070 Blend 18  30  10  35        0% 
China 2,940 IBRD 18  30  - - - 
    
Source: The World Bank 
 
According to the AsDB graduation policy, India and China are eligible for its ordinary 
capital lending resources and have limited access to the Asian Development Fund, which grants 
concessional loans. In fact, this status gives borrowing member countries the opportunity to 
receive loans at low interest rates only for specific projects. Given that both countries have 
adequate capabilities for debt repayment at market rates, as mandated by the donors, China and 
India have not had access to the AsDF since the late 1990s.  
Brazil has been able to apply for loans from the Fund for Special Operations (part of the 
Inter-American Development Bank) since the Fund’s establishment. Concessional lending is 
currently closed to Brazil, although the country is still repaying its commitments to the Inter-
American Development Fund which account for 1,6% of total outstanding borrowings from the 
IADB group as of the end 2008 (IADB, 2009).  
Operational policies of development banks also define the percentage of a project’s total 
cost that can be financed by multilateral institutions, based on the relative development level of 
the borrower. The remainder of project financing has to come from local or international 
investors. For example, the IADB rates Brazil as an advanced economy among all the bank’s 
loan recipients and provides up to 60% of the amount required to finance an eligible project. 
The least developed countries of Latin America can receive 90% of project financing from the 
bank.  Cost-sharing policy of the World Bank applies to overall lending to a specific borrower 
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country rather than to individual projects and is set according to the country’s per-capita income. 
India and China can receive up to 75% of total financing for eligible projects.  
Table 3 
Cost-sharing policy of MDBs 
 
 Brazil Russia India China 
World Bank 60% 60% 75% 75% 
IADB 60% - - - 
AsDB - - 60% 60% 
EBRD - 32%* - - 
* Cumulative EBRD lending to Russia as a share of total eligible project value.  
 
The AsDB fixes the cost-sharing ceiling on project basis according to the borrower 
country’s access to ordinary or soft loan resources. After China and India became eligible only 
for hard window financing, the cap on project financing by the AsDB was lowered from 80% to 
60%. The EBRD has no formal lending cap policy for the public sector. The EBRD, more than 
other MDBs, seeks co-financing from other international financial institutions (Asian 
Development Bank, 2002). Cumulative lending of the EBRD to Russia amounted only to 32% 
of the total eligible project value. However, cost-sharing practices of multilaterals reflect the 
fact that the banks’ participation in project finance is much less than the fixed maximum level. 
Multilaterals also design their lending policy to limit borrower concentration. According 
to the IBRD rules, its exposure to any country should not exceed 10% of its loan portfolio. India 
and China are currently quite close to this limit (at around 8% each). The Andean Development 
Corporation’s charter does not allow it to disburse more than 30% of its total lending to any one 
country. The IADB does not limit the exposure to a single country. The IADB classifies all its 
borrowing members into two groups according to their GDP per capita. The first group 
comprises nine most advanced economies of the region (with Brazil as one of them), while the 
second includes all other member states with GDP per capita lower than USD 3,200. According 
to the IADB lending policy, not less than 35% of its total loan portfolio should be disbursed to 
Group Two countries.   
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Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn from observing the eligibility of BRICs for, 
and their access to, MDB funds. BRICs’ strong economic growth have influenced their 
cooperation with MDBs in several ways. First, BRICs were limited with their access to 
concessional funds of MDBs. Disqualification of India from concessional lending is just a 
matter of time. Secondly, BRIC countries got donor status in some regional and sub-regional 
MDBs, but the extent of their membership differs from country to country. China has become 
the most active donor among BRICs so far, joining regional and sub-regional MDBs in Latin 
America and Africa. 
 
4. Operations of MDBs in BRICs 
 
Analysis of MDBs operations in BRICs covers mainly the activity of the World Bank 
group and regional development banks which play a prominent role among all multilateral 
development institutions in providing development finance to BRIC countries.  
During the last decades, BRIC countries have increased borrowings from multilateral 
development banks. Since 1996, the outstanding loans of India and Brazil granted by MDBs, as 
shown in Figure 1, have nearly doubled to USD 38 and USD 26  billion, respectively, as of 1 
July 2009. China’s outstanding borrowings have exceeded USD 30 billion. Significant growth 
in transaction amounts in BRICs arises from their strong economic growth and rising demand 
for capital resources. In the meantime, MDBs considerably increased their loan portfolio over 
the 1990s and the 2000s, which has also enabled them to disburse more financial resources to 
BRICs.  
The only exception is Russia, whose exposure to MDB lending has been in decline since 
the early 2000s. Figure 1 also notes Russia’s relatively low level of public borrowings from 
MDBs in comparison with other BRIC countries. After the financial crisis of 1998, Russia 
revised its policy for external sovereign borrowing and borrowing from international financial 
organizations. Declining demand for loans from MDBs is explained by the new principles of 
Russia’s external borrowing program that can be described as follows: 
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 Limiting, as much as possible, loan commitments to foreign states and international 
financial organizations for implementation of new projects financed by the federal 
government; 
 Maximum attraction of loans to finance projects already in progress in order to 
complete these projects.  
At the same time, Russia is increasing its private borrowings from multilateral banks 
which provide lending to private companies.  
Figure 1 
Outstanding debt of BRICs to MDBs 
 
Outstanding debt of IBRD, IDA, IADB, AsDB.  
Source: Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-WB External Debt Hub, Central bank of Russia. 
 
Among MDBs, the World Bank represents the main source of development finance for 
BRICs, and had accumulated a loan portfolio to these countries amounting to USD 127.8 billion 
from the IBRD window and USD 46.1 billion from the IDA as of year-end 2008. Regional 
development banks are gradually catching up with the lending volumes of the World Bank. The 
IADB’s total disbursements to Brazil that year reached USD 34.5 billion in comparison with 
IBRD loans of  USD 42 billion. AsDB lending to India and China are at almost exactly the 
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same level – USD 20.6 and USD 21.0 billion, respectively. Russia’s exposure to MDB lending 
is the smallest among BRICs. For example, the IBRD’s total lending to Russia amounts to just 
USD 14.2 billion, which is a small fraction of Russia’s potential to absorb development loans.  
Table 4 
Cumulative approved lending of MDBs in BRIC countries ($ billions) 
 
 Brazil Russia India China Total 
accumulative 
lending 
International 
IBRD 42,0 14,2 37,1 34,5 446,0 
IDA - - 36,2 9,9 193,0 
Regional 
IADB 34,5 - - - 169,3 
ADB - - 20,6 21,0 143,5 
EBRD  15,7*   n/a 
Sub-regional 
Eurasian development 
bank 
 0,6   1,2 
* - Cumulative lending for the period 2000-2009 
 
 
The practice of MDB lending to BRICs shows that increasing loan portfolio does not 
depend on their share of subscribed capital and is generally based on the size of the economy 
and its debt repayment capacity. As shown in the section 3, MDBs develop their lending policy 
to provide uniformity of loan disbursement among recipients. Despite that policy, BRIC 
countries have become the largest borrowers of MDBs. Their share in IBRD total commitments 
reached 29% in 2008. AsDB assistance for China and India accounts for 14.6% and 14.4% of 
the total amount of disbursed loans, which is more than loan disbursements to any other Asian 
country. Brazil left behind all other IADB recipients attracting more than 20% of its approved 
loans as of the end 2008. It is interesting to mention that during some years the share of Brazil 
reached more significant levels. For example, in 2004 Brazil received 43.4% of the bank’s 
annual lending. Russia is currently the largest recipient of EBRD and sub-regional banks’ loans.  
Attracting as they do a significant portion of multilateral development finance, BRIC 
countries increase geographical disparities of MDBs operations. First of all, BRICs, as large 
economies, require much more financial resources than other countries of the corresponding 
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regions. Secondly, BRICs’ leadership in MDB borrowings also reflects the fact that BRIC 
countries are more attractive borrowers for MDBs due to their lower credit risk compared to 
that associated with smaller, poorer developing and emerging markets. This situation results in 
a relatively greater competitiveness of BRICs for lending and in a diversion of capital from less 
developed countries in favor of economies with a greater potential (Abalkina, Golovnin, 
Libman, 2005).  
In spite of increasing volumes of MDBs operations, the dependence of BRIC countries on 
multilateral long-term loans is declining. For example, the share of MDBs is declining in the 
total lending to China. Disbursements of international financial organizations accounted for 
15.8% of China's total outstanding debt in 1998 and fell to 7.6% in 2007. The reliance of Russia 
on borrowings from multilaterals also fell dramatically. Multilateral borrowings accounted for 
3.8% of the country’s total external debt in 2000, and their share sank below 1% by the 
beginning of 2009. India, whose reliance on multilateral lending is more considerable among 
BRIC countries, also registered a decline in percentage terms. The share of MDB lending in 
India’s total outstanding debt declined from 26.2% to 21.7% over 2004-2007. The reason for 
the declining role of multilateral aid lies in the substantial increase in private capital inflow to 
BRIC countries during the last decades as a result of rapid economic growth, investment 
climate improvement, liberalization of capital account operations. Total investments rose 
significantly in BRICs during 1997-2007 (from 3.2x in India up to 7.7x in China) and they 
reached USD 114 billion in Brazil, USD 211.2 billion in Russia, and USD 241.2 billion in 
China in 2007. The overall capital inflow into India stood at USD 47.5 billion in 2006.  
Whereas public borrowing was the main source of external lending in 1995, in 2007 
private companies and banks, which had received access to international markets, increased 
international debt commitments considerably. While private capital investments in BRIC 
countries have surged dramatically in 1990s and 2000s, MDBs disbursements as a share of 
public borrowings is growing more gradually.  
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Table 5 
BRIC external debt 
 
 Total 
external debt 
Long-term debt Short-term 
debt Public and publicly 
guaranteed 
Private 
nonguaranteed 
Total IBRD and 
IDA loans 
1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
Brazil 160,5 237,5 98,3 80,0 6,0 9,7 30,8 118,3 31,2 39,2 
Russia 121,4 370,2 101,6 70,4 1,5 4,8 0,0 160,4 10,2 40,4 
India 94,5 221,0 80,4 74,4 27,3 33,4 6,6 102,9 5,0 43,7 
China 118,1 373,6 94,7 87,6 14,2 21,9 1,1 82,3 22,3 203,7 
Source: World development indicators, 2009.  
 
 
Cost-sharing mode of projects financing made it possible to mobilize additional capital for 
project realization and stimulate BRICs to develop themselves. MDBs have developed close 
relations with investors which participate in project financing. For example, for every USD 100 
IADB granted to Brazil out of its resources, the bank raised an additional USD 189.5 from other 
sources. MDBs increasingly practice co-financing together with the IMF, UN agencies, national 
development banks. 
Over recent decades, there has been a trend of decline in net non-concessional lending 
from international financial institutions. Among BRIC countries, only India still relies on 
concessional loans. According to outstanding foreign debt data provided by the Reserve Bank 
of India, concessional lending accounts for 69% of all outstanding borrowings from multilateral 
organizations as of June 2007. Government borrowings on a bilateral basis are made mainly on 
concessional terms (around 76% of all bilateral borrowings). Since China’s transformation into 
a market economy, the policy towards external borrowing has been relatively conservative and 
was mainly limited to long-term borrowing on concessional terms from foreign governments 
and international organizations, i.e. the official sources (Bell et al., 1993). Soft-window loans 
were primarily used for institutional innovations and agricultural projects in poor regions. The 
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forced shift to market-based loans changed the direction of MDBs investments which went 
mainly to support infrastructure and industrial projects (Sanford, 1997). 
Discussion is still ongoing about access of China and India to soft-loan facilities. On the 
one hand, both countries are capable of raising enough capital on international financial markets. 
On the other hand, given the significant regional disparities in economic development, the 
poorer regions within both countries suffer from insufficient development finance.  
The case against concessional financing to China and India includes not only good 
economic performance of the countries, but also increasing criticism of MDB operations. 
According to Meltzer report (2000), countries with access to international capital markets, or 
middle income economies, should not borrow from multilateral development banks due to the 
fact that MDB loans are an inexpensive substitute for capital resources from commercial 
institutions (Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2002b). 
Although private capital cannot substitute for development aid, as private investors are 
mostly interested in profitable private projects and much less in public sector reforms, poverty 
reduction, education, health, environment, etc. (Lecea, 2007). The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that private capital comes mostly in short-term loans, unlike MDB 
lending. 
Research data shows that MDBs play a counter-cyclical and stabilizing role during 
economic stress (Dasgupta, Ratha, 2000). Multilaterals also help to relieve uncertainty on local 
markets by rebuilding market confidence (Gurria, Volcker, 2001). Multilateral banks increase 
lending during economic crises and support stabilization programs. Figure 2 shows the growth 
of BRICs loan commitments during the 1997-1998 economic crisis. The most significant 
increase was registered in Brazil, whose stabilization programs were supported by multilateral 
development banks. 
Analysis of dependence of MDB loans on the inflow of foreign direct investment in China 
reflects the changing correlation between these two factors. There is no evidence that World 
Bank loans played a counter-cyclical role in 1981-2000. Since China’s transition to market 
economy, the foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as IBRD and IDA loans were growing. 
However, since the beginning of the 2000s, IBRD commitments become counter-cyclical to 
private FDI inflows (the correlation between FDI and the World Bank loans is rather high and 
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negative at -0.49). It follows from this that World Bank lending has started to play a stabilizing 
role in China in response to volatility of private capital movement.   
Figure 2 
FDI and the World Bank lending as a % of GDP 
 
 
The World Bank, IMF.  
 
During the 1990s, the World Bank gradually reduced the volume of its lending to China. 
In fact, there was a policy limit for increasing loan commitments due to IBRD policy of 10% 
limit of loan exposure to any one country. Actually, it reflected the fact that China’s potential to 
attract development finance is much higher than MDBs’ capabilities to grant it.  
Therefore, MDB performance in BRICs can be characterized by the following trends. 
During the last decade, outstanding loans granted by MDBs doubled in all BRICs except Russia 
which limited its external sovereign borrowing. BRICs have become the principal recipients of 
loans from the MDBs where they have borrowing member status. Despite this significant 
increase in MDB lending to BRICs, their dependence on multilateral aid is decreasing due to 
private capital inflows. At the same time, MDB loans remain the main source of external 
sovereign borrowing. MDB lending has a positivve influence on BRIC economies in two ways. 
First, MDB lending has played a counter-cyclical role in China since 2000. Second, the cost-
sharing mode of project financing by MDBs allows BRICs to mobilize additional capital. 
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5. Distribution of MDB loans by sector and their effectiveness 
 
Distribution of MDB lending by sector 
The main differences in sector distribution of multilateral assistance to BRIC countries 
arise from the structure of their economies, the level of economic development, availability of 
concessional lending, MDBs’ country-specific policies, and BRICs’ approach towards 
attracting financial resources from MDBs.  
Multilaterals do not work out a common policy towards BRIC countries and banks’ 
activity is provided according to the country strategy of each organization. For example, the 
World Bank’s country partnership strategy is prepared by the Bank’s country departments and 
is discussed with the national governments of BRICs. Therefore, the lending policy represents 
the consensus between the World Bank development goals and each national government’s 
approach towards foreign assistance. 
Despite difficulties involved in the classification of the World Bank loan distribution 
structure it is clear that the bank’s loans were mainly allocated to stimulate competitiveness of 
BRIC countries, reduce poverty and support reforms, rather than realizing social projects. 
According to cumulative approved loan data (see Table 6), the World Bank’s lending focused 
on building infrastructure (20.2% in Brazil and 34.6% in China) and supporting agriculture 
(24.1% in India, 16.6% in China, and 15.8% in Brazil).  
Russia’s transition to market economy and its transformation crisis forced the country to 
search for external sources to finance its economic stabilization programs (mainly the IMF and 
the IBRD). Russia (which actively interacted with the IBRD mostly before the 1998 financial 
crisis) mainly applied for adjustment loans and reform assistance (legal reform project, fiscal 
technical assistance, tax administration modernization, etc.). Public administration and law 
projects absorbed nearly 40% of the IBRD cumulative lending.   
Public administration projects together with infrastructure projects were also a priority in 
Brazil. As much as 19.5% of total IBRD lending to that country was allocated to 
implementation of fiscal and pension reforms and environmental projects, mainly in the 1990-
2000s.  
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Table 6 
Sector distribution of IBRD and IDA loans, % 
(as of the end of 1H 2009) 
 
 Brazil Russia India China 
Agriculture, fishing, and 
forestry 
15.8 3.4 24.1 16.6 
Education 7.8 0.8 7.0 4.0 
Energy and mining 6.1 22.0 15.1 15.8 
Finance 7.1 7.0 7.5 2.8 
Health and other social 
services 
10.7 5.5 8.5 1.8 
Industry and trade 2.9 12.2 4.6 4.1 
Public Administration, 
Law, and Justice 
19.5 38.1 6.5 1.6 
Transportation 20.2 9.3 18.8 34.6 
Water, sanitation and flood 
protection 
10.1 1.0 5.9 18.0 
Information technology and 
communications 
- 0.8 2.1 0.5 
Source: Calculations based on the World Bank project database according to the first 
major sector.  
 
The MDB strategy towards BRIC countries has been transformed over time responding to 
the needs and challenges of each specific borrower. Cumulative lending data do not provide 
evidence of changing priorities in MDB lending to BRICs.  
Brazil 
The World Bank’s operations in Brazil, which totaled USD 1 billion over time, were 
initially concentrated in power sector and infrastructure in the 1950-60s. The impact of IBRD 
operations in Brazil were quite limited. Starting in the 1970s, the bank’s lending portfolio 
became more diversified with a focus on education, industry development and transportation 
projects. It is interesting to mention that initially agriculture was not a priority of the World 
Bank assistance to Brazil. The first agricultural project was approved only in 1967 for the 
purpose of livestock development. In the 1990s and 2000s, Brazil shifted from poverty 
alleviation projects to adjustment lending.  
Development of IBRD operations in Brazil currently faces new challenges which are 
connected with the activity of national development institutions. Thus, the lending volumes of 
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the Brazilian development bank (BDB) are much higher than those of the IBRD, and BDB loan 
approvals already reached USD 100 billion in 2009. In this connection, the World Bank adopted 
a new country partnership strategy which sets priorities for future cooperation between Brazil 
and the IBRD. Taking into consideration other significant channels of development finance 
available to Brazil, the World Bank is going to focus on long-term challenges, to which Brazil 
has not yet devised solutions, and where international experience can be of particular value. 
Thus, the World Bank is not aiming to increase the volume of development finance, but to offer 
advice for development and to help Brazil to become equitable, sustainable and competitive. 
Russia 
In the early 1990s, all IBRD projects in Russia aimed at rehabilitation of manufacturing 
and support for reforms in various spheres (land, tax and legal reforms; oil, natural gas and coal 
rehabilitation projects; support of industrial companies and banks, etc.). The IBRD also 
approved three tranches of structural adjustment loans which were a part of the IMF 
stabilization program. Actually, in 1997 IBRD approvals in Russia reached an all-time 
maximum of USD 3 billion. The last adjustment loan was approved on the eve of the 1998 
financial crisis. After the crisis, Russia’s cooperation with the World Bank was limited to some 
technical assistance projects (for example, for development of a statistics collecting system). 
Since 2000, annual IBRD disbursements barely exceeded USD 200 million, a tiny amount for 
the Russian economy.  
Russia, unlike the other BRIC countries, does not rely on IBRD financing due to changes 
in its sovereign borrowing program (see Section 4). During the 2000-2009 period, Russia 
cooperated only with those international financial institutions that provide assistance for the 
private sector. The EBRD and the International Financial Corporation became the main foreign 
institutional investors in Russia.  
India 
India’s cooperation with the World Bank has been developing slowly. In 1960s IBRD 
loans were mainly allocated in infrastructure sector. After the foundation of concessional 
window India became a significant borrower of resources to finance the support of  agriculture. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, agriculture, social sector, electric utilities, and infrastructure received 
the largest amount of World Bank loans.  
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The overall external assistance gives the evidence of other lending priorities. Thus, in the 
mid-1990s, external assistance was focused on power sector (1/3 of total). In the 2000s, 
priorities shifted towards the social sectors which was in accordance with Millennium 
Development Goals (Government of India, 2008).  
China 
China’s collaboration with the World Bank initiated in 1981 with the approval of 
educational project which aimed to strengthen higher education in the country. In 1980s lending 
volumes were rather modest and they significantly increased in 1990s reaching USD 2.4 billion 
of yearly disbursements to the country. In 2000s water sanitation, transport and energy projects 
were mainly supported. Infrastructure development was considered to be one of the most 
effective ways of promoting market integration, poverty reduction and development of inland 
China (World Bank, 2005).  
According to the country partnership strategy for 2006-2010 the World Bank aims to help 
to integrate China into the world economy; reduce poverty, inequality and social exclusion; 
manage resource scarcity and environmental challenges; deepen financial intermediation; 
improving public and market institutions.  
Does regional MDB lending intersect with World Bank operations? 
As was mentioned in the previous section, BRIC countries have become the principal 
borrowers of regional development banks. Sub-regional, regional and international development 
banks usually collaborate to work out a common policy for development finance. According to 
the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, multilaterals should cooperate to 
provide an adequate supply of finance to countries that are challenged by poverty, follow sound 
economic policies and may lack adequate access to capital markets. They should also mitigate 
the impact of excessive volatility of financial markets (United Nations, 2002). Multilateral 
banks often practice co-financing of projects that aim to support financial or disaster relief and 
recovery, and to build large infrastructure projects, etc.  Therefore, they unite their financial 
resources to achieve the development goals of BRICs and supplement each other.  
When granting loans separately, MDBs have a moderate overlapping in the case of India, 
China and Brazil. Due to different missions of the IBRD and the EBRD, the two development 
institutions play mostly complementary role in Russia. 
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The experience of Brazil’s borrowings from multilaterals gives the evidence of moderate 
intersections of their activity specially in power sector and infrastructure development. The 
Inter-American Development Bank’s infrastructure portfolio is much larger than IBRD’s and 
the regional bank supports urban development more actively. The IADB provided very limited 
assistance to agriculture. Its education, healthcare and environment protection portfolios were 
smaller than IBRD’s (World Bank, 2004). The moderate overlapping of MDB’s activity is a 
result of Brazil’s government dialog with multilateral banks and definition of sector priorities 
for each development institution.  
 
Figure 3 
IADB distribution of loans by sector in Brazil (2004-2008), % 
 
 
 
 
 
The experience of China and India as borrowers from MDBs provides evidence of small 
overlapping of the AsDB and IBRD/IDA operations and of the AsDB’s specialization in 
financing infrastructure and power utilities sector. As shown in Table 7, China’s energy and 
transportation and telecommunication sectors received 70% of cumulative AsDB lending, and 
in the case of India these sectors account for almost 64% of AsDB lending. AsDB loans are not 
used to support agriculture, especially in India, and for water supply and healthcare projects.  
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Table 7 
China and India: Cumulative AsDB Lending as of 31 December 2008 
 
 China India 
Sector Loans 
(no.) 
Amount  
($ million) 
% Loans 
(no.) 
Amount 
($ million) 
% 
Agriculture and 
Natural Resources 
15 1325,60 6,31 2 93,31 0,45 
Energy 30 2967,78 14,13 41 6799,39 33,03 
Finance 2 80,72 0,38 13 2410,00 11,71 
Industry and Trade 9 1044,80 4,97 9 335,90 1,63 
Multisector 18 1865,12 8,88 20 2958,00 14,37 
Transport and 
Communications 
62 11822,50 56,29 32 6366,85 30,93 
Water Supply, 
Sanitation and Waste 
Management 
18 1897,66 9,03 5 614,40 2,98 
Law, Economic 
Management and 
Public Policy 
- - - 6 950,00 4,61 
Health, Nutrition and 
Social Protection 
- - - 2 58,64 0,28 
a
 Total may not add up because of rounding  
Source: ADB 
 
Russia remains a key focus of EBRD operations. Due to the EBRD’s mission to stimulate 
the market transition of borrowing member countries and the promotion of private and 
entrepreneurial initiative, the bank, unlike the other regional development institutions, mainly 
supports the private sector. During 2000-2008, the EBRD directed 86% of its Russian lending 
portfolio to the Russian private sector. The EBRD is highly involved in financing investments 
in the corporate sector, for example automotive, metals, machinery and telecom sectors. The 
EBRD’s another priority in Russia is supporting the financial sector. The EBRD grants loans to 
banks for the provision of funding to small and medium-sized enterprises, for the development 
of trade finance and retail banking. The investments are also designed to promote corporate 
governance and institutional improvements in the financial sector. For that purpose, the EBRD 
provides equity investments and has become a shareholder in a number of Russian banks. 
However, the EBRD does not aim to control a bank, limiting its share in the local bank’s 
authorized capital at 35%.  
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Figure 4 
Sector breakdown of current projects of EBRD in Russia, % 
 
Source: EBRD 
 
 
International and regional MDBs play a complementary role in BRIC countries by co-
financing large-scale projects or proving emergency financial facilities. Different missions and 
specializations of MDB operation in BRIC countries result in a moderate overlap of their 
activity.  
Effectiveness of MBD loans in BRICs 
 
The problem of evaluation of project effectiveness in BRICs raises two interrelated 
questions: How to estimate impact of development finance instruments of MDBs in BRIC 
countries when the banks’ operations are relatively small compared with the size of BRIC 
economies? And is there any link between MDB interventions and acceleration of growth rates 
in BRICs?  
Multilaterals evaluate their projects by taking into consideration project relevance (the 
extent to which the objectives of a project are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements), 
achievement of the objective (extent to which a project’s objectives were achieved), efficiency 
(the extent to which project benefits/output are commensurate with expenditures/inputs) and 
sustainability (the probability of continued long-term benefits). An aggregate project 
performance indicator can be rated on a four-level scale (unsatisfactory, partly unsatisfactory, 
satisfactory and excellent) or a two-level scale (unsatisfactory and satisfactory/successful).  
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The World Bank provides its own evaluation of projects in BRICs (see Table 8). The 
satisfactory grade of a project indicates the achievement of the project’s objectives and can be a 
signal of a side or direct positive influence of MDBs on development processes in BRICs.  
Table 8 
The World Bank projects evaluation in China, India and Brazil 
 
 Number of 
projects 
Total net 
commitments 
($ million) 
Net commitments 
Outcome 
(% 
satisfactory) 
Sustainability 
(% likely) 
Institutional 
development 
impact (% 
substantial) 
1993-1997 
China 54 6,760 89 83 46 
Brazil 41 4,679 72 65 41 
India 70 10,858 71 55 29 
Bankwide 1,195 90,962 74 56 36 
1998-02 
China 53 8,546 93 96 80 
Brazil 41 7,314 94 95 62 
India 58 8,260 77 77 49 
Bankwide 1,314 102,095 82 75 50 
Source: The World Bank.  
 
Among BIC countries, India has the lowest grades of project evaluation, which are also 
below the bank-wide level. Only 71% of all projects were satisfactory in 1993-1997, and only 
77% were successful during 1998-2002. China, on the other hand, is considered to be the most 
successful country among BICs in achieving project objectives and development impact. It is 
important to note, however, that project performance in all BICs improved over 1993-2002.  
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Table 9 
China and India: AsDB Project Success Rates (as of the end 2008) 
 
 China India 
By Sector Percentage 
 
No. of Rated 
Projects 
Percentage 
 
No. of Rated 
Projects 
Agriculture and Natural Resources 42.9 
 
7 - - 
Energy 93.3 15 81.3 
 
16 
Finance 100.0 1 75.0 8 
Industry and Trade 62.5 8 - - 
Multisector 83.3 6 80.0 5 
Transport and Communications 94.4 36 45.5 11 
Water Supply, Sanitation, and 
Waste Management 
100.0 5 - - 
Law, Economic Management, 
and Public Policy 
- - 33.3 3 
Total 85.9 78 67.4 43 
By Year of Approval     
1980s 66.7 6 70.0 10 
1990s 85.9 64 64.0 25 
2000s 100.0 8 75.0 8 
Source: AsDB.  
 
Evaluation of projects by sector in India and China gives the evidence that the most 
successful projects were realized by AsDB in energy and financial sectors. The less satisfactory 
projects were recorded in the Indian transport sector and Chinese agriculture and natural 
resources. The dynamics of successful projects share is also positive as of the World Bank.  
During the last decades, BRIC countries have witnessed two simultaneous processes. First, 
BRICs have achieved significant results in poverty reduction and economic development. 
Second, over the same time, MDBs have increased their operation amounts in the countries. But 
there are no proven links between these two processes, i.e. between MDBs intervention in 
BRICs and improved economic situation in the countries.  
Due to the fact that MDBs are niche players in BRIC countries, it is difficult to rate their 
contribution to development. For example, the World Bank’s activity in Brazil has made a 
moderate contribution to the reduction in poverty rates in the 1990s as measured by national 
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income (World Bank, 2004). The bank’s operations are noticeable only in Northeast regions of 
Brazil. Little is known about development contribution of the IADB in Brazil. According to 
country program evaluation, the development impact and the achievement of the development 
objectives stipulated under the loans are not monitored (Inter-American Development Bank, 
2004).  
MDBs lending is modest for a such large-scale economy as China. It amounts to only 4% 
of government expenditure. At the same time, China is considered to be one of the most 
successful countries to fight poverty. MDB-supported poverty-reduction programs have a 
relatively low share. For example, poverty-targeted intervention by the World Bank accounts 
for 15% of total lending to China. Although the experience of China shows that infrastructure 
projects with poverty reduction component (i.e. highways that integrate remote markets) could 
be more beneficial to the poor than direct transfers or interventions (World Bank, 2005).  
MDB weaknesses 
We can classify problems and difficulties of MBD cooperation into three groups: critics 
on MDB performance, country level problems and project management efficiency.  
Critics on MDB performance 
MDB activity has been criticized for many years. Critics of MDBs are concerned that 
multilaterals’ practice often differs from their written policies and official statements (Upton, 
2000). 
Multilaterals are also criticized for their ideological approach towards borrowers forcing 
policy reforms. In case of Russia and Brazil, World Bank lending (together with IMF programs) 
is perceived by a group of scholars and politicians as an instrument of neoliberal agenda that 
does not take into consideration the peculiarities of national development models (Stiglitz, 
2002).  
Multilateral programs of private sector support (specially by EBRD, IFC, etc.) are 
criticized for interfering with market financing. The Meltzer Commission Report provides the 
evidence that commercial banks are ready to finance infrastructure and social programs if their 
loans are secured by government guarantees (Meltzer, 2000).  
Some recent projects in BRIC countries prove the break of additionality principle of MDB 
lending. For example, the World Bank together with IADB have financed the largest 
infrastructure project in Latin America worth USD 2.1 billion – the construction of a pipeline 
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designed to deliver gas from Bolivia to Brazil. In effect, MDB participation in this project is a 
substitute for investments by such private companies as Gas Transboliviano, Enron Corp. and 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Vásquez, director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the 
Cato Institute, notes that “if the lending agencies are not supplanting sources of private finance, 
then they are second-guessing the market's judgment about the financial worthiness of such 
investments” (Vásquez, 1998).  
Another example concerns the performance of the International Investment Bank in 
Russia, which provides loans to the private sector on market terms, and acts more as a 
commercial bank than a development one.  
One more obstacle to improving BRICs collaboration with MDBs is the ineffective 
structure of these organizations. Most sub-regional development banks in which Russia is a 
member are not effective financial institutions due to their small size, modest operation volumes, 
non-transparent organizational and operational structure. Thus, the Interstate Bank of the CIS is 
nowadays mostly inactive in granting development loans. Its lending volumes are not enough to 
be a noticeable multilateral institution. Essentially, the project to establish an investment and 
payment-clearing institution for the Former Soviet Union (the FSU) has failed.  
The International Investment Bank and the International Bank for Economic Co-operation 
are making a modest impact on the capital markets of their member states. Their operation 
volumes do not exceed several hundred million US dollars per annum and their loans are 
mainly issued to commercial banks and large companies. For example, in 2007, the IIB granted 
loans to the total amount of EUR 56.3 million. IIB does not have a credit rating issued by 
international agencies, which complicates raising capital, for example, through bond issues.  
Country-level problems 
Country-level obstacles to collaboration with MDBs mainly have to do with the level of 
economic and institutional development and the specific country’s policy towards multilaterals. 
Development assistance by multilaterals is not enough for large-scale economies like BRICs. 
Their need for financial resources is much greater than the potential of multilaterals. The 
experience of China is rather demonstrative. The IBRD lending to China reached nearly 10% of 
the bank’s portfolio in the late 1990s. The future lending and country assistance were suspended 
due to constraints posed by exposure limits of IBRD (10% limit of portfolio lending to one 
country). China and IBRD agreed to prepay some debts and to make offset purchase of IBRD 
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bonds so the bank can increase its annual lending to a projected USD 1.2 – USD 1.3 billion 
(World Bank, 2005).  
Russia does not have a comprehensive policy for raising capital externally to boost 
economic growth, to enhance industry competitiveness and to support reforms. Borrowing 
programs have been worked out according to MDB policy and the strategic and tactic goals of 
selected ministries without definition of priority sectors that need financial support (Voprosy 
Economiki, 2002). For example, cooperation with the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank 
is developing slowly due to omission by the Russian Ministry for Economy Development to 
choose those projects that can be realized with BSTDB participation.  
Russia faces also some other difficulties with coordination of external borrowings. First, 
the Russian budget law fixes the limit of borrowings from international financial organizations. 
Though priorities and industry structure of the capital raised are defined by the Russian 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Economic Development. Second, Russia has seen projects 
financed by MDBs get under way before the relevant budget was signed into law. Third, 
borrowing from international financial institutions increasingly ignored debt service. The result 
of inadequate policy was uneven loan maturity schedules with high peaks of repayment 
amounts. This situation led to the need to borrow more money to repay old debts.  
Project management obstacles  
Commonly encountered project management obstacles are delays in realization of a 
project, lack of explicit reasonable grounds for expenses, lack of a national system of project 
evaluation and monitoring.  
Table 10 
Share of total undisbursed loans by MDB as of the end 2008, % 
 
 Brazil Russia India China 
The World Bank 18,9 32,0 33,5 25,1  
Regional MDBs 14,0 13,9 34,8* 29,4* 
* - Undisbursed share of effective loans 
Source: World Bank, IADB, AsDB, EBRD.  
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Brazil 
During the 1980s, the outcomes of World Bank projects in Brazil had worse ratings than 
bank-wide, (World Bank, 2004). Only 59% of all projects were rated satisfactory in comparison 
with the World Bank’s average of 69%. Brazil significantly improved its project management in 
the second half of the 1990s due to a sharp turnaround in project performance. As a result of 
management improvements, the share of undisbursed loans declined. Nowadays Brazil has the 
highest level of disbursed lending among BRICs.    
Russia 
A study by the Audit Chamber of Russia on effectiveness of World Bank loans  provides 
evidence of delays in project implementation. Projects were delayed, on average, by 2.5 years 
(30 months) during 1992-2000. The number of projects covered by the study that were not 
finished on time was increasing. The reason for such delays has to do with the lack of 
implementation and monitoring mechanisms for MDB loans in Russia. (Voprosy Economiki, 
2002). The Audit Chamber also found significant unjustified expenditures which included 
foreign experts’ advice.  
The share of misused loans issued by the World Bank to Russia is one of the highest 
among BRICs. It can be explained by changes in external borrowing programs and by freezing 
of projects in the late 1990s.  
India 
India mostly relies on multilateral assistance which is a significant source of capital inflow 
for the country. India, like all BRICs, runs into project management difficulties. First of all, 
India has the highest level of undisbursed loans which account for 1/3 of total approvals by the 
World Bank and AsDB.  
 
China  
According to World Bank estimates, the overall portfolio risks in China are rather low, but 
still there are a number of recurring problems (World Bank, 2005). Portfolio risk assessments 
reveal slow disbursements that result in additional payments from the federal budget (0.25% of 
unsused resources). The World Bank disbursements account for ¾ of total approvals that is less 
of overall bank average. AsDB disbursements amount to 70.6% of total approved lending.  
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National audit findings provide evidence of slow implementation of projects. The National 
Audit Office of China (CNAO) conducted an audit in 2007 of financial revenues and 
expenditures and project implementation in 2006 for projects associated with 117 foreign loans 
and aid projects implemented or organized by departments of the central government. 
According to the results of the audit, 23 projects were not completed according to plan, or 
19.7% of the total.  
6. Policy implications 
 
1. Despite the impressive results of economic development, China still has 200 million 
poor people who subsist on less than USD 1 a day. Weak sectors and poor regions feel 
an increasing demand for development finance. Due to restrictions on MDB 
concessional lending to China, the country needs to simulate the IDA or AsDF terms in 
order to respond to the poor regions’ need for financial resources. 
2. Capital accumulation has allowed China to play a more important role as a donor of 
development aid. Taking into consideration the existing threats of limitation of MDB 
lending to China due to its good performance and fear of donors to finance a competitor, 
China should promote the foundation of a sub-regional development bank in East Asia. 
The new sub-regional bank could solve the following problems: 
- Usage of donor and borrowing member status according to the interests of China; 
- Access to long-term loans on favorable terms; 
- Increase of lending amounts; 
- Promotion of regional integration; 
- Possibility to develop a regional capital market;  
- Contribution to the Asian bond initiative.  
3. There is still a need for improvement in project management (especially in agricultural 
and industry and trade projects) to reduce implementation delays, undisbursements, and 
to increase the share of satisfactorily completed projects.  
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Table 11 
SWOT analysis of MDB operations in China 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Access to lending windows on 
favorable terms  
 Access to long-term lending 
windows 
 Mobilization of additional resources 
from public and private investors 
 Possibility to finance large-scale 
projects that could not be financed by 
private investors 
 Good debt repayment capacities of 
China 
 
 Disparity between MDB lending 
amounts and scale of China’s 
economy  
 Project management risks of 
implementation delays and 
undisbursements 
 Existence of unsatisfactory projects 
 Conditional lending  
 Restrictions on concessional lending 
 
Opportunities Threats 
 Counter-cyclical role of MDB loans 
 Opportunity to use emergency 
lending window for natural disaster or 
economic crises relief and recovery 
 Possibility to implement best 
practices 
 Availability of expert advice from 
MDBs 
 
 Possible restriction of MDB lending 
due to strong debt repayment 
capacities 
 Eligibility and country exposure 
policy does not allow MDBs to 
increase lending volumes 
 Donor countries may decide not to 
finance a competitor  
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Abbreviations 
 
 
AfDB  African development bank 
AsDB  Asian development bank  
AsDF Asian development fund 
BLADEX  Latin American Export Bank 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China 
BSTDB  Black Sea Trade and Development Bank  
CABEI  Central American Bank for Economic Integration  
CAF  Andean Development Corporation  
Comecon  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  
EABR  Eurasian Development Bank 
EBRD  European bank for reconstruction and development  
EIB  European Investment Bank  
IADB  Inter-American development bank  
IBEC  International Bank for Economic Co-operation   
IDA International Development Association  
IFC  International Finance Corporation 
IIB  International Investment Bank  
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
MDB Multilateral development bank   
NIB  Nordic Investment Bank  
WADB West African development bank 
 
